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Defendant/Respondent, Albert Kienke, respectfully 
submits the following Brief of Respondent. 
JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This case is an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from a 
unanimous decision of the Utah Court of Appeals dated May 10, 
1989, affirming summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant/Respondent, Albert Kienke. Plaintiff filed a Petition 
for Rehearing, which was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals on 
June 2, 1989. The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari on 
August 31, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented to this Court for 
review: 
1. Whether landowner owes his tenant a duty to warn or 
to make safe a dangerous condition that was created by and known 
to the tenant. 
2. Whether a part-time landlord, whose tenant 
performed repairs and improvements to the rental premises in 
exchange for rent without controls by the landowner, is liable 
for injuries to the tenant as a statutory employer under the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
3. Whether punitive damages are appropriate against a 
landlord where the tenant died from injuries sustained as a 
result of a risk created by the tenant. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This Court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann., Section 
35-1-42, as amended 1983; Section 35-1-43, as amended 1984; and 
Section 35-1-57, as amended 1969, may be pertinent to one of the 
issues on appeal. Copies of said statutes as they read at the 
time of the incident in question in January of 1985 are set forth 
in Appendix "A" to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing 
Plaintiff's wrongful death action. Plaintiff's decedent, Robert 
English, was in the process of rebuilding the front porch of a 
house that he was renting from the Defendant when the temporary 
supports Mr. English had placed under the roof of the porch gave 
way and the roof fell on him, resulting in his death. Plaintiff 
filed suit against the landowner, Albert Kienke, alleging that 
Mr. Kienke was negligent in failing to make safe or to warn the 
decedent of the dangerous condition of the porch created by the 
decedent and further alleging that Mr. Kienke was liable as 
Mr. English's employer under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
Plaintiff's Complaint further sought punitive damages against 
Mr. Kienke, alleging "knowing and reckless disregard for the 
safety of Plaintiff's deceased." 
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2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
At the conclusion of discovery the parties filed 
counter-motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court, Honorable 
David S. Young presiding, denied Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Summary Judgment was entered by the Trial Court on 
September 4, 1987. 
Plaintiff appealed the Summary Judgment of the Trial 
Court and on May 10, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its 
decision affirming the Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant. 
Plaintiff filed a Petition for Rehearing, which was denied by the 
Utah Court of Appeals on June 2, 1989. 
Plaintiff petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ 
of Certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
The Supreme Court granted the Petition and this case is now on 
appeal before the Utah Supreme Court. 
3. Statement of Relevant Facts 
The "Statement of Relevant Facts" in Appellant's brief 
is argumentative, conclusory, misleading and without support in 
the record. Appellant's Statement of "Facts" refers repeatedly 
to conclusions of law stated in Plaintiff's Memorandum filed with 
the Trial Court (R. 181, 182), none of which were supported by 
the depositions and pleadings on file with the Court. These 
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assertions of "Facts11 were fully disputed and controverted in the 
deposition of Albert Kienke and in Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 153-157). 
The uncontroverted facts are as follows: 
1. Albert Kienke has worked for the Utah Department of 
Transportation for the last 25 years as a land acquisition agent. 
He has a part-time business as a small landowner. (Deposition of 
Albert Kienke, Record at 269, pp. 4-6, 14-16). 
2. Defendant, Albert Kienke, and his wife were the 
joint owners of a house located at 1031 Windsor Street in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (Id. at p. 3). 
3. In December 1984, the house was in need of 
extensive repairs. There was a hole in the ceiling, holes in the 
doors, kitchen cabinet doors needed to be rehung, the carpet 
needed to be replaced and the front porch needed work. (Id. at 
pp. 38-42). 
4. The ceiling inside the front porch was in poor 
shape and one beam on the north side of the front porch was 
sagging considerably. The roof of the porch was supported by big 
columns which needed paint but other than that, there was nothing 
wrong with them. (Id. at p. 42). 
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5. Robert English was born on March 18, 1957. He was 
28 years of age at the time of his death. (Deposition of Daniel 
English, Record at 267, p. 4). 
6. Robert English was a graduate student at the 
University of Utah at the time of his death. (Record at 146, 
148) . 
7. In January of 1985 Robert English telephoned 
Mr. Kienke to ask him if he had a place to rent. Mr. Kienke 
responded that the only place that was vacant was the house at 
1031 Windsor which needed "an awful lot of repairs." Mr. English 
said that he was interested in doing the repairs. (Deposition of 
Albert Kienke, Record at 269, pp. 44-46). 
8. Mr. Kienke met Mr. English at the Windsor Street 
house in January 1985. Mr. English said he needed a place to 
rent but he didn't have a lot of money. Mr. Kienke said the 
place needed a lot of work. Mr. English asked if he could do 
the work in exchange for the rent. Mr. Kienke agreed. (Id. at 
pp. 46-47). 
9. Mr. Kienke showed Mr. English the property and 
pointed out what repairs were needed, including a new plywood 
floor, new linoleum in the kitchen, new kitchen cabinets, a new 
floor and linoleum in the bathroom, paint in the kitchen, paint 
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on the outside, and repair work on the ceiling of the front 
porch. (Id. at pp. 48-52). 
10. The front porch seemed solid but Mr. English 
suggested that he could repair the bottoms of the posts on the 
two outside corners of the porch and that he could repair a 
couple of loose boards on the steps. (Id. at pp. 52-54). 
11. Mr. English drew up all of the plans for repairs 
and submitted them to Mr. Kienke for approval. (Id. at pp. 55-
57). 
12. Mr. Kienke paid for the materials used by either 
giving Mr. English checks in advance, or by reimbursing 
Mr. English later. (Id. at p. 57). Mr. Kienke occasionally 
supplied materials himself. (Id., at pp. 60-62). 
13. Mr. English planned the work himself, and did the 
work on his own. Mr. Kienke testified: 
Well, he wanted to do it all and plan it. So 
I just left him alone and let him do it 
because he was doing it. He was in charge of 
it, and he was doing it. 
(Id. at p. 56). 
14. Mr. English did all of the work himself except 
that Mr. Kienke made a jam for the back door which Mr. English 
installed. (Id. at p. 58). 
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15. During the time that Mr. English was working on 
the house, Mr. Kienke would not see Mr. English for a month or 
two at a time. (Id. at p. 62). 
16. The only instructions Mr. Kienke gave to 
Mr. English regarding the repairs were that he wanted good 
quality work done, but not to go overboard on the expense, 
because it was a rental unit. (Id. at pp. 55-60). 
17. Mr. English provided most of his own hand tools 
but borrowed a power Skil saw, a shovel, a tub to mix cement and 
a roof jack from Mr. Kienke. (Id. at pp. 66, 67). 
18. Before Mr. English began work on the porch, he 
told Mr. Kienke that he was going to replace the two posts on 
each end of the porch and pour cement footings for the posts. 
Mr. Kienke told Mr. English not to do any more than he had to, 
but mainly repair the porch ceiling, repair the sagging beam on 
the north side of the porch, and install some planks on the 
floor. (Id. at pp. 68-70). 
19. In December 1985, Mr. English telephoned 
Mr. Kienke and said he wanted to show Mr. Kienke what he had done 
on the porch. Mr. Kienke went to the house and was shocked to 
find that the whole lower part of the porch, the decking, the 
steps, and the sub-beams had been removed. All that remained was 
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the roof of the porch and the three columns which Mr. English had 
supported with cement blocks. (Id., at pp. 71-73). 
20. Mr. Kienke told Mr. English to be certain to have 
plenty of two-by-fours at the sides of the porch to support the 
ceiling. Mr. English told Mr. Kienke how he was going to build 
the porch and his plans appeared adequate to Mr. Kienke. (Id. at 
p. 74). 
21. On January 4, 1986, the roof of the porch fell 
from its temporary supports onto Mr. English, causing his death. 
(Complaint, Record at p. 3, paragraph 2). 
22. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the following causes 
of action against Defendant, Albert Kienke: 
a. Mr. Kienke breached his duty as a 
landowner by failing to reasonably discover 
dangerous conditions on the land, failing to 
warn Mr. English and failing to barricade and 
limit access to the porch area. 
b. Mr. Kienke was the employer of 
Mr. English and Mr. Kienke breached his duty 
as his employer by failing to provide a safe 
place to work, failing to supervise the 
decedent and failing to adequately prepare 
and design the construction project. 
c. Mr. Kienke acted in knowing and reckless 
disregard for the law and the rights of the 
decedent, thereby entitling Plaintiff to 
punitive damages. 
(Record at pp. 2-5). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Albert Kienke was under no duty to warn his tenant, 
Robert English, of dangerous conditions on the premises that were 
not only known to Mr. English, but were actually created by 
Mr. English. The alleged dangerous condition, i.e., the 
inadequate support for the porch roof, was created by Mr. English 
strictly on his own, contrary to his previous discussion with 
Mr. Kienke. Even if Mr. Kienke had a duty to warn Mr. English of 
the dangerous condition of the porch created by Mr. English, 
Mr. Kienke clearly satisfied that duty after he saw the condition 
created by Mr. English by instructing Mr. English to be certain 
to have plenty of two-by-fours at the side of the porch to 
support the roof, instructions which Mr. English apparently 
ignored. 
2. The Court of Appeals correctly held that since 
Albert Kienke was not negligent as a matter of law, it was not 
necessary to reach the issue of whether Mr. Kienke was a 
statutory employer of Mr. English under the Utah Workers1 
Compensation Act. If it were necessary to decide that issue, the 
lower court correctly ruled that Mr. English was an independent 
contractor and not an employee of Mr. Kienke under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. Mr. Kienke did not retain the right 
to supervise or control the work of Mr. English. Also, 
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Mr. Kienke was not regularly involved in the construction trade 
and the work being done by Mr. English was not part or process in 
the trade or business of Mr. Kienke. The work hours and manner 
of performance were not in any manner subject to Mr. Kienke?s 
control. Even the nature of the improvements were in large part 
determined solely by Mr. English and the decision to remove the 
supports from the porch roof was made solely by Mr. English, 
contrary to his prior discussions with Mr. Kienke. Thus, 
Mr. Kienke is not the statutory employee of Mr. English within 
the meaning of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act. 
3. Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages are not 
supported by any evidence and were properly dismissed by the 
Trial Court. The dangerous condition which contributed to 
Mr. English's death was created by Mr. English himself. The 
record contains no evidence that Mr. Kienke was guilty of any 
willful or malicious conduct or acted with knowing and reckless 
disregard for the safety of Mr. English. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that: 
[Summary] judgment shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
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material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to adjudgment as a matter of law. 
Moreover, in negligence actions, as in all cases, bare 
contentions that are unsupported in the record, raise no material 
issues of fact as will preclude the entry of summary judgment. 
Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980). 
The case at bar presents no genuine issues of material 
fact. Robert English created the risk himself when he removed 
the solid support columns and replaced them with temporary 
support posts placed on top of stacks of cement blocks. 
Mr. Kienke is not liable for a dangerous condition created by his 
tenant. 
POINT I 
LANDOWNER KIENKE WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO WARN 
HIS TENANT ENGLISH OF RISKS THAT NOT ONLY 
WERE OBVIOUS AND APPARENT, BUT WERE CREATED 
BY THE TENANT. 
The uncontroverted deposition testimony of Albert 
Kienke establishes that the condition of the porch which resulted 
in its collapse and the death of Robert English was not created 
by any actions or inaction on the part of Albert Kienke, but was 
instead created solely by the decedent, Robert English. Prior to 
Mr. English's work on the porch, the ceiling and one beam on the 
north side of the porch were in disrepair but the columns which 
supported the porch roof were strong and stable. It was 
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Mr. English?s idea to remove those support columns and replace 
them with temporary posts supported on cement blocks. In fact, 
this was contrary to his previous discussions with Mr. Kienke in 
which Mr. Kienke told Mr. English he should not do any more than 
he had to, but mainly repair the porch ceiling, repair the 
sagging beam on the north side of the porch and install some 
planks on the floor. 
When Mr. Kienke saw the porch in December of 1985, he 
was shocked to see that Mr. English had removed the whole lower 
part of the porch, including the columns and replaced them with 
temporary supports on cement blocks. At that time Mr. Kienke 
told Mr. English to be certain to have plenty of two-by-fours at 
the sides of the porch to support the porch roof. Mr. Kienke did 
not return to the house again until January 4, 1986, after the 
roof of the porch fell from its temporary supports onto 
Mr. English, causing his death. 
The law in Utah is well settled that a landlord is not 
liable to his tenant for injuries caused by dangerous conditions 
created by the tenant. In Stephenson v. Warner, 581 P. 2d 567 
(Utah 1978), the plaintiff's service station attendant sued both 
his employer and the lessor of the station for burns he suffered 
while using gasoline to clean up grease spots on the floor in the 
presence of a water heater flame. The Utah Supreme Court upheld 
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summary judgment in favor of the landowner, holding that while a 
landowner may be liable for injuries caused by dangerous 
conditions created by the landlord or of which the landlord was 
aware when possession of the property was transferred to the 
tenant, the landlord cannot be liable for injuries caused by 
dangerous conditions created by the tenant. The Court stated: 
. . • it is the tenant who is liable for any 
dangerous condition on the premises which he 
creates or permits to come into existence 
after he has taken possession (cites 
Restatement of Torts 2d, Section 355*) 
In the present case the alleged dangerous condition 
(the inadequate support posts for the porch roof) was created 
solely by Mr. English without any involvement whatsoever by 
Mr. Kienke. Mr. Kienke had not wanted Mr. English to remove the 
strong support columns on the porch and it was solely 
Mr. English's decision to do so. When Mr. Kienke saw the 
condition he told Mr. English to use plenty of two-by-fours to 
support the porch roof but Mr. English apparently did not do so 
because the porch roof collapsed on Mr. English several days 
later. Mr. Kienke had absolutely nothing to do with the creation 
of the dangerous condition which resulted in Mr. English's death 
and it was solely created by Mr. English* Therefore, under well-
established law Mr. Kienke is not liable for the death of 
Mr. English. 
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The Appellant's brief is essentially asking this Court 
to overrule the decision in Stephenson, reject the position of 
Restatement of Torts 2d, Section 355 and rule that a landlord has 
a duty to continually inspect the tenant's premises to determine 
whether the tenant has created dangerous conditions on the 
property and to protect the tenant from injuries resulting from 
his own negligence. Plaintiff fails to cite a single case which 
would support such an extraordinary rule. Instead, Plaintiff's 
brief cites the very recent decision from the Utah Court of 
Appeals of Donahue v. Purfee, 118 Utah Advance Reports 64 (Utah 
Ct. of App., September 28, 1989), which rejected the long-
standing "open and obvious danger rule," holding that the fact 
that a danger is open and obvious is not an absolute defense to 
an action by an injured guest against the landowner for an injury 
caused by that danger. What Plaintiff's brief fails to point out 
is that the Ponahue case specifically reaffirmed the Court of 
Appeals' decision in the present case that a landowner is not 
liable for injuries to the tenant caused by a dangerous condition 
created by the tenant. Footnote 4 to the Ponahue decision reads 
as follows: 
4. Our decision in this case will no doubt 
narrow somewhat the range of cases involving 
landowner liability in which summary judgment 
will be appropriate. However, summary 
judgment will still be available, even 
though the landowner will be unable to take 
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refuge behind the open and obvious danger 
doctrine, in situations where the landowner 
establishes undisputed facts showing he was 
not negligent as a matter of law. Such 
situations include plaintiffs who are solely 
responsible for creating the dangerous 
condition on defendant's land. E.g., English 
v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Utah Ct. of 
App. 1989) 
While the Donahue case casts doubt on the "open and 
obvious danger rule,"x it certainly does not affect in any way 
the long-standing rule that a landlord is not liable for 
dangerous conditions created by the tenant. Plaintiff has 
failed to cite a single case from Utah or any other jurisdiction 
which would support a rejection of that rule. 
Plaintiff's brief claims that Mr. Kienke was "actively 
involved in the repairs." The brief asserts that the record 
"was replete with facts" supporting the inference that Mr. Kienke 
was a "trained contractor/landowner" who controlled the work of 
his tenant and breached his duty to exercise reasonable care 
toward the tenant. Understandably, the brief cites no such facts 
1
 The decision by the Court of Appeals in Donahue is 
subject to some question. In addition to abandoning the open and 
obvious danger rule followed as recently as 1981 by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Moore v. Burton Lumber and Hardware Co., 631 
P.2d 865 (Utah 1981), the Donahue case reasons that the previous 
cases upholding summary judgment under the open and obvious 
danger rule were decided before the adoption of comparative 
negligence. Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978), 
involved an accident after the effective date of the comparative 
negligence law. 
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from the record, as the record simply contains no such facts. 
The evidence is very clear that Mr. Kienke exercised virtually no 
controls over Mr. English's repairs on the house and Mr. English 
took it solely upon himself to remove the strong and solid 
supports to the porch roof and thereby create the dangerous 
condition which resulted in his death. 
Even if Mr. Kienke had any obligation to Mr. English to 
warn him of dangerous conditions, the undisputed evidence clearly 
shows that Mr. Kienke did warn Mr. English and told him to 
provide plenty of two-by-fours to support the roof but 
Mr. English apparently failed to do so. 
The uncontroverted evidence clearly establishes that 
the injuries to and death of Mr. English were caused solely by 
the negligence of Mr. English and not by any negligent act or 
inaction on the part of Mr. Kienke. The Trial Court correctly 
held that Mr. Kienke breached no duty to Mr. English and properly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Kienke. 
POINT II 
ROBERT ENGLISH WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
AND NOT AN EMPLOYEE UNDER THE UTAH WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION ACT. 
Plaintiff has characterized the rental arrangement 
between Robert English and Albert Kienke, by which Mr. English 
did certain repair work on the house in lieu of rent, as an 
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employer-employee relationship. In so doing, plaintiff is 
attempting to take advantage of Section 35-1-57, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended), which provides that where an 
employer fails to provide workers1 compensation coverage to an 
employee, proof of injury to the employee shall constitute prima 
facie evidence of negligence on the part of the employer and the 
employer cannot assert the defenses of assumption of risk and 
contributory negligence. Lacking evidence of negligence, this 
would certainly be advantageous to the plaintiff. Such an 
assertion, however, is clearly not supported in fact or in law. 
The Court of Appeals correctly held that since 
Mr. Kienke was not negligent as a matter of law, it was not 
necessary to reach the issue of whether Mr. Kienke was 
Mr. English's statutory employer. If Mr. Kienke was not 
negligent he cannot be liable under Section 35-1-57, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. Moreover, the uncontroverted facts clearly 
establish that Robert English was not the employee of Albert 
Kienke for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
In Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 
(Utah 1975), the Court examined the difference between an 
employee and an independent contractor. The Court stated: 
Speaking in generality: an employee is one 
who is hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at 
a fixed rate, to perform the employer's work 
as directed by the employer and who is 
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subject to a comparatively high degree of 
control in performing those duties. In 
contrast, an independent contractor is one 
who is engaged to do some particular project 
or piece of work, usually for a set total 
sum, who may do the job in his own way, 
subject to only minimal restriction or 
controls and is reasonable only for its 
satisfactory completion. 
The main facts to be considered as bearing on 
the relationship here are: (1) whatever 
covenants or agreements exist regarding the 
right of direction and control over the 
employee, whether expressed or implied; (2) 
the right to hire and fire; (3) the method of 
payment, i.e., whether in wages or in fees, 
as compared to payment for a complete job or 
project; and (4) the furnishing of the 
equipment. 
Id. at 318. 
In Graham v. R. Thorne Foundation, 675 P.2d 1196 
(Utah 1984), the plaintiff, a roofer, contended that he was an 
employee of the defendant construction company, entitled to 
workers1 compensation coverage. He was paid according to the 
number of roofing squares installed, and he used his own method 
of installation. He would bill the defendant on a monthly basis 
for the work done. The defendant made no deductions for Social 
Security or withholding tax. The plaintiff used his own tools 
and established his own work schedule. The defendant had only a 
few employees, such as bookkeepers, and relied on independent 
contractors to do most of the construction work. The defendant 
furnished the shingles and nails and determined the time the 
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plaintiff should devote to on a specific job. The defendant gave 
the plaintiff instructions as to use of odd pieces of shingles, 
installing flashing and shingling after plumbing was complete. 
The Court held that under these circumstances the plaintiff was 
an independent contractor, and not an employee. The defendant 
did not have sufficient supervision and control over the 
plaintiff to be the plaintiff's employer. 
Applying the rules of the foregoing cases to this case, 
it is clear that Mr. English was not an employee of Albert 
Kienke. Mr. English was not paid a set wage; he received only 
free rent in exchange for the work he performed. The value of 
this rent was never established, nor was the amount of work to be 
performed by Mr. English in exchange for the rent ever 
determined. There were no time limitations placed on 
Mr. English, nor was he told when the work was to be done or what 
hours he should keep. Mr. English did all of the work in the 
house himself except that Mr. Kienke made a jam for the back door 
which Mr. English installed. The only instructions Mr. Kienke 
gave Mr. English regarding the repairs were that he wanted good 
quality work but not to go overboard in expense because it was a 
rental unit. Mr. English made all the plans for the work to be 
done himself and merely submitted the plans to Mr. Kienke for his 
approval, though sometimes this was not even done. 
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Regarding the front porch, Mr. English did not even 
submit the plans to Mr. Kienke before he began the project. 
Instead, he took it upon himself to remove the entire underside 
of the porch and put in the temporary supports for the porch 
roof. Mr. English did all of the work on the porch himself. In 
these facts it is clear that the criteria established in the 
cases cited above are not met. 
It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a 
landowner exercised less supervision or control over the person 
performing work on the landownerf s property than in the present 
case. Had Mr. Kienke hired a private contractor to perform the 
repairs, he certainly would not have provided the contractor 
nearly as much freedom as he allowed Robert English. If the 
Court finds Robert English to be the employee of Albert Kienke, 
any homeowner or small landowner who contracts with any workman 
to perform remodeling or even routine maintenance tasks on his 
home, would be subject to liability for workers' compensation 
benefits in the event of injury to the workman. Such a result 
clearly was not contemplated by the legislature in drafting the 
workers' compensation laws, nor has this Court so interpreted 
them. 
Another serious injustice could result if the Court 
were to hold that Robert English was an employee of Mr. Kienke. 
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The standard commercial liability insurance policy contains an 
exclusion for claims for injuries to an employee arising out of 
or in the course of his employment. See Truck Insurance Exchange 
v. Yardley, 556 P.2d 494 (Utah 1976). A part-time landlord such 
as Albert Kienke would not anticipate that he may be subject to 
workers1 compensation liability in the event of injury to one of 
his tenants who exchanges work for rent. If the tenant is 
injured and sues the landlord, the landlord may then find that 
he has no insurance coverage for the suit, even though he has had 
the foresight to obtain liability insurance. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE AND WERE 
PROPERLY DISMISSED. 
Plaintiff/appellant seeks to recover punitive damages 
against Defendant/appellee, Albert Kienke, alleging that 
Mr. Kienke acted in "knowing and reckless disregard for the law 
and the rights of Plaintiff's deceased" in failing to correct a 
known dangerous condition, failing to prepare proper plans and 
submit them to the appropriate authority for purposes of 
obtaining building permits, continuing construction of the 
premises after being warned of the dangerous condition by the 
Building and Housing Authority and failing to warn Plaintiff's 
deceased of a known dangerous condition on the premises. 
-21-
There is no evidence that Mr. Kienke knew of any 
dangerous condition which contributed to the death of Robert 
English. The dangerous condition which resulted in the death of 
Mr. English was a condition created by Mr. English in removing 
the supports from the porch roof and putting in inadequate 
temporary supports, all of which was done solely by Mr. English. 
All of the plans and construction were done by Mr. English, and 
not by Mr. Kienke. 
In order to establish a cause of action for punitive 
damages, the Plaintiff must prove that the Defendant was guilty 
of "willful and malicious conduct" or that the Defendant's 
conduct "manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, 
and disregard of, the rights of others." Atkin Wright & Miles v. 
Mountain States Tel., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985). There is no 
evidence whatsoever to support such a claim against Defendant 
and the lower court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for punitive 
damages should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
A landowner is not liable to a tenant for injuries 
caused by a dangerous condition which is not only open and 
obvious, but was created by the tenant. The alleged dangerous 
condition, i.e., inadequate supports for the roof was created not 
by the landowner, Mr. Kienke, but by the tenant, Mr. English. 
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Mr. English took it solely upon himself to remove the strong and 
solid supports to the house and to replace them with temporary 
supports on concrete blocks. Mr. Kienke had nothing to do with 
the creation of the dangerous condition. Even if there were any 
duty on the part of Mr. Kienke to warn Mr. English of any 
dangerous condition, he so warned Mr. English and his warnings 
were ignored. Therefore, the lower court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Mr. Kienke. 
The lower court also properly held as a matter of law 
that Mr. Kienke, who allowed Mr. English to do work in exchange 
for rent, was not the employer of Mr. English for purposes of 
Workers' Compensation. Mr. English had a virtual free hand to do 
the work as he pleased, design the improvements himself, and 
choose and purchase the materials. Mr. English determined when 
he would work and, to a large extent, what work he would do. He 
drew up his own plans, performed the work by himself, and, for 
the most part, used his own tools. He was not paid a wage but 
was only allowed to live rent free in the house. Mr. Kienke 
clearly did not retain the right of control necessary to be the 
employer of Mr. English* 
The Trial Court also properly granted summary judgment 
dismissing Plaintiff's punitive damages claims. There is no 
evidence of any willful or malicious conduct or knowing and 
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reckless disregard of the safety of others on the part of 
Mr. Kienke. 
Defendant, Albert Kienke, respectively submits that the 
summary judgment entered by the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this / y 7 day of ^ ^ S r r " , 1989. 
AARON ALMA NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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APPENDIX "A" 
35-1-42 LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
employed at each kind of employment; the scale of wages paid in each class of 
employment, showing the minimum and maximum wages paid; and the aggregate 
amount of wages paid to all employees; which information shall be furnished on 
blanks to be prepared by the commission and furnished employers free of charge 
upon request therefor. Every employer shall cause such blanks to be properly filled 
out so as to answer fully and correctly all questions therein propounded, and shall 
give all the information therein sought, or, if unable to do so, he shall give to the 
commission, in writing, good and sufficient reasons for such failure. The commis-
sion may require the information herein required to be furnished to be made under 
oath and returned to the commission within the period fixed by it or by law. The 
commission, or any member thereof, or any person employed by the commission 
for that purpose, shall have the right to examine, under oath, any employer, his 
agents or employees, for the purpose of ascertaining any information which such 
employer is required by this title to furnish to the commission. Any employer who, 
within a reasonable time to be fixed by the commission and after the receipt of 
written notice signed by at least two members of the commission specifying the 
information demanded and served by registered mail, refuses to furnish to the com-
mission the annual statement herein required, or who refuses to furnish such other 
information as may be required by the commission under authority of this section, 
or who willfully furnishes a false or untrue statement shall be liable to a penalty 
of not to exceed $500 for each offense to be recovered in a civil action brought 
by and in the name of the commission. All such penalties when collected shall be 
paid into the combined injury benefit fund. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 34; C.L. 1917, Compiler's Notes. 
§ 3094, L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1, R.S 1933, 42-1-39;
 T h e 1 9 7 7 amendment deleted "at the state 
L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1, C. 1943, 42-1-39; L. 1945, capitol" after "mail to the commission" near 
ch. 65, § 1, 1977, ch. 156, § 2.
 t n e beginning of the second sentence of the 
first paragraph. 
35-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined — Regularly employed — 
Independent contractors. The following shall constitute employers subject to the 
provisions of this title: 
(1) The state, and each county, city, town and school district in the state. 
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, including every public utility, 
having in service one or more workmen or operatives regularly employed in the 
same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, 
express or implied, oral or written, except agricultural employers who meet any 
one of the following conditions: (a) whose employees are all members of the imme-
diate family of the employer, which employer has a proprietary interest in the farm 
; provided that the inclusion of any immediate family member under the provisions 
of this title is at the option of the employer or (b) who employ five or fewer persons 
other than immediate family members for 40 hours or more per week per each 
employee for 13 consecutive weeks during any part of the preceding 12 months; 
and except domestic employers who do not employ one employee or more than one 
employee at least 40 hours per week; provided, that employers of agricultural labor-
ers and domestic servants, shall have the right to come under the terms of this 
title by complying with the provisions thereof and the rules and regulations of the 
commission. 
The term "regularly" as herein used shall include all employments in the usual 
course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer, whether 
continuous throughout the year or for only a portion of the year. 
Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for him 
by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and such work 
is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor, and 
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ail persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, and ail persons 
employed by any such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this 
section, employees of such original employer. Any person, firm or corporation 
engaged in the performance of work as an independent contractor shall be deemed 
an employer within the meaning of this section. The term "independent contrac-
tor," as herein used, is defined to be any person, association or corporation engaged 
in the performance of any work for another, who, while so engaged, is independent 
of the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject 
to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in the performance of a 
definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting 
a result in accordance with the employer's design. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 50; C.L. 1917, 
§3110; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 42-1-40; 
L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-40; L. 1949, 
ch. 52, § 1; 1975, ch. 101, § 1; 1983, ch. 355, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment substituted "except 
agricultural employers: (a) whose employees 
are * * * or more than one employee at least 
forty hours per week" in subsec. (2) for 
"except agricultural laborers and domestic 
servants." 
The 1983 amendment inserted "who meet 
any one of the following conditions" in 
subsec. (2); inserted "all" in subsec. (2)(a); 
added the proviso to subsec. (2)(a); deleted a 
subsec. (2)(b) which read: "whose cash pay-
ments to one or more employees amounted to 
less than $2,500 during the preceding calen-
dar year"; redesignated subsec. (2)(c) as 
(2)(b); substituted "who employ five or fewer 
persons other than immediate family mem-
bers" in subsec. (2)(b) for "who do not 
employ at least four persons", and made 
minor changes in phraseology and style. 
Contractor employees. 
The cleaning of oil storage tanks was a 
part or process in the business of an oil 
refining company, and the company was the 
employer of a contractor's employees 
engaged to clean the tanks. Lee v. Chevron 
Oil Co. (1977) 565 P 2d 1128. 
Employee and independent contractor. 
Subcontractor, who was both owner and 
employee of his business, was considered 
employee of general contractor for workers' 
compensation purposes where metal work 
done by subcontractor was part of process in 
general contractor's business, and where gen-
eral contractor had substantial right, under 
the arrangement, to control the 
subcontractor's work. Pinter Constr. Co. v. 
Frisby (1984) 678 P 2d 305. 
Independent contractor. 
Where workers' compensation claimant 
was injured while installing roof for general 
contractor, it was not arbitrary or capricious 
to deny benefits on the ground that claimant 
was a self-employed contractor, even though 
general contractor furnished materials and 
directed claimant to some extent with regard 
to the manner of installation. Graham v. R. 
Thorne Foundation (1983) 675 P 2d 1196. 
Subcontractor, who was both owner and 
employee of his business, was considered 
employee of general contractor for workers' 
compensation purposes where metal work 
done by subcontractor was part of process in 
general contractor's business, and where gen-
eral contractor had substantial right, under 
the arrangement, to control the 
subcontractor's work. Pinter Constr. Co. v. 
Frisby (1984) 678 P 2d 305. 
Relationship of employer and employee. 
Where "independent contractor" had no 
choice of the terms of his truck lease, drove 
a truck owned by lessor, hauled only loads 
that had been approved by his supervisor, 
was not free to refuse a load, was obliged to 
travel a certain route, and operate a certain 
number of miles per month at a specified 
speed, there was reasonable basis for conclu-
sion of the industrial commission that plain-
tiff was an employee within the meaning of 
the workmen's compensation statute. Harry 
L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton (1975) 538 
P 2d 316. 
Evidence showing that claimant was an 
experienced drywall installer associated with 
an independent business; that plaintiff lodge 
contacted the business concerning installa-
tion of drywall on its premises; that the busi-
ness was not interested, but plaintiff and 
claimant individually agreed that claimant 
would do the work for a specified hourly rate; 
that under the terms of the agreement claim-
ant was to furnish his own special tools and 
plaintiff was to furnish him with a ladder 
and protective drop cloth; that plaintiff 
employed a "handyman crew" to conduct 
maintenance and repair work for it; that 
before beginning work claimant was "taken 
over the entire job," shown what services 
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were to be performed, shown where to stack directed claimant to some extent with regard 
the drywall and told not to damage the floor; to the manner of installation. Graham v. R. 
and that he was not allowed to begin work Thorne Foundation (1983) 675 P 2d 1196. 
at his first appearance was sufficient to sup- Subcontractor an employee. 
port a finding that claimant was plaintiffs
 n . , , ^ , 
l™r.u,r««
 o n j fufl ™™™;oo™ A;A ™* nk„o« Subcontractor, who was both owner and 
employee, ana the commission aid not abuse , - , . ' , ., , 
its discretion in awarding compensation for emP °yee °/ h l s business, was considered 
injuries sustained when claimant suffered a employee of general contractor for workers 
fall while working at the lodge. Rustler compensation Purposes where metal work 
Lodge v. Industrial Comm. (1977) 562 P 2d d o n e bf subcontractor was part of process in 
227 general contractor s business, and where gen-/ . , , • , . , . . i . eral contractor had substantial right, under A truck driver who took a tractor home in ,, . .8 , . . 
, , , , the arrangement, to control the order to service and clean it was an employee , . . , ,
 D. . n . n 
, . , , , ,
 M ,, . * subcontractor s work. Pinter Constr. Co. v. of the trucks owner as well as the lessee of ™ • ,
 t,noA\ ^Q D OJ one 
the truck. Kinne v. Industrial Comm. (1980) F n s b y (1984) 6 ' 8 P 2 d 305 ' 
609 P 2d 926. Tests and determinative factors. 
Where workers' compensation claimant In determining who is the employer of an 
was injured while installing roof for general employee, the right to control the employee's 
contractor, it was not arbitrary or capricious work is dispositive of the question; the 
to deny benefits on the ground that claimant degree of control actually exercised need not 
was a self-employed contractor, even though be great, so long as the right exists, 
general contractor furnished materials and Bambrough v. Bethers (1976) 552 P 2d 1286. 
35-1-43. "Employee," "workmen," and "operative" defined — Mining les-
sees and sublessees — Partners and sole proprietors — Real estate agent or 
broker. (1) The words "employee," "workmen/' and "operative," as used in this 
chapter, mean: 
(a) every elective and appointive officer, and every other person, in the service 
of the state, or of any county, city, town, or school district within the state, serving 
the state, or any county, city, town, or school district under any election or appoint-
ment, or under any contract of hire, express or implied, written or oral, including 
all officers and employees of the state institutions of learning^]; and 
(b) every person in the service of any employer as defined in Subsection 
35-1-42(2), who employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in the same 
business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express 
or implied, oral or written, including aliens, and minors whether legally or illegally 
working for hire, but not including any person whose employment is casual and 
not in the usual course of trade, business, or occupation of his employer. 
(2) All lessees in mines or of mining property and the employees and sublessees 
of all such lessees shall, unless the lessee provides coverage as an employer under 
this chapter, be covered for compensation by the lessor under this chapter, and 
shall, in such event, be subject to this chapter and entitled to its benefits to the 
same extent as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such wages as are 
paid employees for similar or substantially similar work. The lessor may deduct 
from the proceeds of ores mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance 
premium for such type of work. 
(3) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to include as an employee 
under this chapter, any member of such partnership, or the owner of the sole 
proprietorship. If such election occurs, the employer shall serve upon the employ-
er's insurance carrier and upon the commission written notice naming the partners 
to be covered. No partner is considered an employee under this chapter until such 
notice has been given. For premium rate making the insurance carrier shall assume 
the salary or wage of such employee to be 150% of the state's average weekly wage. 
(4) As used in this chapter, the words "employee," "workman," and "operative" 
do not include a real estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Section 61-2-2, 
who performs services as such for a real estate broker if: 
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(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's or associated broker's income for 
services is from real estate commissions; 
(b) the services of the real estate agent or associated broker are performed 
under a written contract specifying that the real estate agent is an independent 
contractor; and 
(c) the contract states that the real estate agent or associated broker is not 
to be treated as an employee for federal income tax purposes. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 51, C.L. 1917, 
§ 3111; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1, 1925, ch. 73, § 1; 
R.S. 1933, 42-1-41; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 
42-1-41; L. 1943, ch. 48, § 1; 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 
1949, ch. 52, § 1: 1957, ch. 62, § 1, 1963, ch. 49, 
§ 1; 1975, ch. 101, § 2; 1984, ch. 76, § 1; 1985, 
ch. 75, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment deleted "except agri-
cultural laborers and domestic servants" 
after "Every person" at the beginning of 
subsec. (l)(b); deleted "devoting full time to 
the partnership or proprietorship business" 
from the end of the first sentence in subsec. 
(3) and substituted "$866.67 per month" for 
"$400 per month" in the last sentence of 
subsec. (3); and made minor changes m 
phraseology. 
The 1984 amendment redesignated subsec-
tions; substituted "chapter" for "title" in 
subsec. (1); substituted "chapter" for "act" in 
the first and third sentences of subsec. (3), 
substituted "1501 of the state's average 
weekly wage" in the last sentence of subsec. 
(3) for "$866.67 per month", and made minor 
changes in phraseology, punctuation and 
style. 
Business of employer. 
Owner of ten parcels of real property on 
which were 19 rental units which owner 
actively managed was in the rental business, 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 52a; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3113; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
42-1-43; L. 1984, ch. 75, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1984 amendment substituted "as pro-
vided in this chapter" in the first sentence 
and employee he hired to paint and repair 
units for forty hours a month was not within 
the exclusion of subd. (2) of this section. 
Sorenson v. Industrial Comm. (1979) 598 P 2d 
362. 
Loaned employee. 
Where employee of trucking company was 
assigned by the company to haul a load of 
wood paneling for the defendant and directed 
by the company to assist defendant's employ-
ees in loading the truck, for purposes of this 
act the truck driver became defendant's 
employee during the loading process, and 
when he was injured in the course of it, his 
remedy against defendant was limited to the 
collection of workmen's compensation bene-
fits. Bambrough v. Bethers (1976) 552 P 2d 
1286. 
Volunteer worker. 
Helper in a school shop class pursuant to 
the Retired Senior Volunteer Program was a 
volunteer worker, and not an employee of the 
school, and was therefore not entitled to 
workers' compensation benefits, where there 
was no express or implied contract of hire 
between the helper and the school, the helper 
received no compensation from the school, 
and the school had no control over his hours 
or any other aspect of his volunteer work 
Board of Education of Alpine School Dist. v. 
Olsen (1984) 684 P 2d 49. 
for "as is herein provided", added the second 
sentence; and made minor changes in phrase-
ology, punctuation and style. 
Accident. 
Death of employee who had a preexisting 
35-1-45. Compensat ion for indust r ia l accidents to be paid. Every employee 
mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured, and the dependents of every such 
employee who is killed, by accident arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-in-
flicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or 
death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, 
and, in case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. 
The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and hospital 
services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be 
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
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History: L. 1917, CIL 100, §67; C. L. 
1917, §3128; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1 ; R. S. 
1933, 42-1-53; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
42-1-53. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1939 amendment inserted "as herein 
provided" near the beginning of the sec 
tion; and made a minor change in punctu-
ation. 
Form and sufficiency of notice. 
Oral notice to employee does not comply 
with requirements of this section. Murray 
v. Strike, 76 U. 118, 287 P. 922. 
Purpose and object of notice. 
The purpose of requiring notices to be 
posted is to inform all those who may seek 
employment that payment of compensation 
to which they may become entitled is 
secured as provided in act (35-1-1 et seq.) ; 
such notice is for benefit of employees or 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, §68; C. L. 
1917, §3129; R. S. 1933, 42-1-54; L. 1939, 
ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-54; L. 1969, ch. 86, 
§2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1939 amendment substituted "two 
sections next succeeding" for "section next 
succeeding" m the fourth sentence. 
The 1969 amendment added the fifth 
sentence. 
Cross-Reference. 
Fellow servants, 34-25-1 et seq. 
Applicability of section. 
The word "employer'' is used in this 
for those who seek employment. Industrial 
Comm. v. Daly Mining Co., 51 TJ. 602, 172 
P. 301. 
This section is intended to require all 
employers to post notice with appropriate 
information whether the employer provid-
ed insurance or elected directly to pay 
compensation; and intent and purpose of 
section being clear, it cannot be defeated 
by inadvertent omission of certain words 
since court will give it effect in order to 
effectuate what clearly appears to be its 
true purpose. If employer fails to bring 
himself within provisions of Workmen'3 
Compensation Act by compliance with 
this section, the employee may pursue 
his common-law remedies against emplover. 
Murray v. Strike, 76 U. 118, 287 P. 922. 
Collateral References. 
Workmen's Compensahon<§=*1045. 
100 C.J.S. W o r k m e n ' s Compensation 
§357. 
section to encompass only an employer in 
a situation where the employment status 
is localized in Utah. United Airlines 
Transport Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 110 
U. 590, 175 P. 2d 752. 
Election between causes of action. 
Where plaintiff, in his amended com-
plaint, set forth three alternative causes 
of action, the first two in negligence and 
the third under this section and 35-1-46, 
it was reversible error for the lower court 
at the pretrial hearing to require plaintiff 
to make an election between the three 
causes contrary to Rule 8 (e) of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Rosander v. Larsen, 
14 U. (2d) 1, 376 P. 2d 146. 
35-1-57. Noncompliance—Penalty.—Employers who shall fail to comply 
with the provisions of section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the benefits of 
this title during the period of noncompliance, but shall be liable in a civil 
action to their employees for damages suffered by reason of personal in-
juries arising out of or in the course of employment caused by the wrongful 
act, neglect or default of the employer or any of the employer's officers, 
agents or employees, and also to the dependents or personal representatives 
of such employees where death results from such injuries. In any such ac-
tion the defendant shall not avail himself of any of the following defenses: 
the defense of the fellow-servant rule, the defense of assumption of risk, 
or the defense of contributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall con-
stitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the employer and 
the burden shall be upon the employer to show freedom from negligence re-
sulting in such injury. And such employers shall also be subject to the 
provisions of the two sections next succeeding [35-1-58, 35-1-59]. In any 
civil action permitted under this section against the employer the employee 
shall be entitled to necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fee assessed 
against the employer. 
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